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Abstract 
This paper analyses the socio-political profile and the governmental career of the junior ministers who 
held office in Portugal between 1976 and 2011, putting the focus on the differentiation between indi-
viduals with and without prior political experience. Contrary to what is indicated in the literature, the 
results of this investigation reveal that most of these individuals are politically inexperienced and have 
a short and occasional governmental career. There are, however, important differences if we consider 
their political background, which confirms the relevance of the distinction between political and non-
political junior ministers.
Keywords: Elites, political elites, political recruitment, governmental career, junior ministers, government, 
Portuguese democracy. 
Resumen
Este artículo analiza el perfil sociopolítico y la carrera gubernamental de los secretarios de Estado que 
asumieron el cargo en Portugal entre 1976 y 2011, poniendo el foco en la diferenciación entre los in dividuos 
con y sin experiencia política previa. Contrariamente a lo que se indica en la literatura, los resultados de 
esta investigación revelan que la mayoría de estos individuos es políticamente inexperta y tiene carrera 
gubernamental breve y ocasional. Sin embargo, existen diferencias importantes si tenemos en cuenta 
los antecedentes políticos, lo que confirma la importancia de la distinción entre secretarios de Estado 
políticos y no políticos. 
Palabras clave: élites, élites políticas, reclutamiento político, carrera gubernamental, secretarios de Estado, 
gobierno, democracia portuguesa. 
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INTRODUCTION
Thirty years ago, Jean Blondel wrote the seminal study Government Ministers in the 
contemporary world (1985), one of the key works in the systematic exploration of the 
ministers’ profile and their governmental career. This author started from the idea that the 
strategic institutional position of ministers allows them to hold resources and conditions 
the results of the political system at a higher level than other politicians, which makes them 
“actors in the strong sense of the word”, and therefore deserving of special attention from 
researchers (Ibid. 1985: 7). Using a comparative approach, the author fixed his attention 
on ministers’ recruitment and governmental career, two of the most significant dimensions 
in the analysis of governmental elites. In the footsteps of Blondel, an influential line of 
research has since deepened this analysis, allowing thorough knowledge, both nationally 
and compared, of the social and political characteristics of European ministers and the 
main specificities of their governmental career (Dogan, 1989; Blondel & Thiébault, 1991; 
Stefan, 2004; Tavares de Almeida et al., 2006; Blondel et al., 2007; Dowding & Dumont, 
2009; Rodriguez-Teruel, 2011)1.
Nevertheless, unlike ministers, junior ministers have remained largely terra incognita 
in the political science literature. In spite of their integration in the governmental elite, 
junior ministers have had a clearly meagre treatment. According to Thies, “while compre-
hensive data sets on ministers are now available, data on junior ministers and other insti-
tutional arrangements within cabinets are rare finds” (2001: 47). The further address of this 
position emerged in the UK. Milne (1949) was one of the first authors devoted to the study 
of junior ministers. In 1987, Theakston published Junior Ministers, a work that would be 
a reference in this subject (Theakston, 1987) and continued it in more recent works 
(Theakston, 1999; Theakston et al., 2012; Mcmaster & Bairner, 2012). Although these 
British authors have initiated and developed an important discussion on the role of the 
junior ministers in government, this discussion was restricted to the UK and not aimed at 
the thorough knowledge of the socio-political profile and governmental careers of these 
actors. Only recently, preliminary studies on the junior ministers of the Spanish democ-
racy have emerged, where the focus is on patterns of recruitment (Real-Dato & Rodriguez-
Teruel, 2013; Real-Dato, Rodriguez-Teruel & Jerez-Mir, 2013)2.
The main reason for the lack of literature is mainly the widespread understanding that 
they become (exclusively) relevant in coalition governments. So, they become a reward of 
party elites in the context of the creation of a coalition government (Laver & Schofield, 
1985). From another point of view, they would be a means of partisan balance at the time 
of distribution of governmental portfolios, ensuring some proportionality to the coalition 
parties (Mershon, 1996; Manow & Zorn, 2004). These arguments have been made in 
 1. Previous important works include Wilson (1959), Ollé-Laprune (1962), Dogan (1967), Rose (1971), Headey 
(1974), Birnbaum (1982) and Gaxie (1983).
 2. Although these working papers present only preliminary conclusions, we use them in this article as an impor-
tant source of comparison between Portuguese and Spanish junior ministers.
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particular to Italy (Cotta & Verzichelli, 2007: 121) and Spain (Bar, 1988: 130). However, 
Magone states that the balance of portfolios is not a relevant reality in Portugal, due to the 
importance of the Prime Minister in the selection of ministers and junior ministers (2000: 
549-550).
Another perspective associated with coalition governments perceives junior ministers 
as a means to control government officials belonging to the other party (Thies, 2001; Ver-
zichelli, 2008; Carroll & Cox, 2012; Indridason & Kristinsson, 2013; Falcó-Gimeno, 
2014). According to this view, they would function as a kind of “watchdogs”, controlling 
the minister’s initiatives, or “guidedogs”, being effective communication links between the 
two parties (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005: 128). However, Verzichelli (2008: 261) empirically 
tested the minister’s function of control, and concluded, by analyzing the partisan compo-
sition of the ministries in coalition governments, that junior ministers with these functions 
in Portugal are not usual.
Outside the scope of the analysis of junior ministers in coalition governments, the lit-
erature looks at this position as having a learning character. Indeed, authors such as De 
Winter (1991: 60) and Theakston et al. (2012) have seen junior ministers as “minister’s 
apprentices”, either as a test of adaptability to the governing problems of individuals with-
out political experience or as a means of sectorial specialization of the most politicized 
elites. For this reason, only short subchapters or occasional references have been reserved 
to these political actors in works focused on ministerial recruitment or governmental struc-
ture (Blondel, 1982; Blondel & Müller-Rommel, 1988; De Winter, 1991; Searing, 1989, 
1994). 
On the other hand, both the perspective that sees the junior ministers as partisan pawns 
in coalition governments and the one that gives them a learning function aimed at ministe-
rial ascent have difficulty interpreting the position of junior ministers in countries such as 
Portugal, where there are several one-party governments and those hold a significant 
importance in the day-to-day life of the ministry, particularly in terms of policy formula-
tion (Lobo, 2005b: 190, 193; Miranda & Sousa, 1985). Consequently, junior ministers 
with a strong degree of politicization and junior ministers without political background 
seem to coexist in these countries. This is, however, a perception that lacks empirical con-
firmation, as the existing studies are extremely rare. For Portugal, in particular, we do not 
know any specific and systematic research on junior ministers (hereinafter referred to as 
secretaries of state, the Portuguese official term) of the democratic period. The only spe-
cific work on secretaries (and under-secretaries) of state in Portugal is the study by Car-
valho and Fernandes (2003). These authors identify the socio-political profile and analyze 
the governmental career of these individuals during the period known as Marcellismo 
(1968-1974), comparing ministers, members of Parliament and secretaries/under-secretar-
ies of state.
Thus, some questions remain to be answered. What are Portuguese junior ministers 
for? What characteristics and experiences do they hold and how can their careers in gov-
ernment be characterized? What are the main differences between the junior ministers who 
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have a political profile and the have-nots? This article aims to answer these questions 
through an analysis of the recruitment and governmental career of the Portuguese secretar-
ies of state appointed between July 1976 and March 2011, i.e., from the first to the thir-
teenth constitutional government3. Consequently, our unit of analysis are individuals who 
were secretaries of state, no matter how many times they had been named, so our database 
contains 555 individuals. We deliberately left out of the analysis the secretaries of state 
who were appointed in provisional governments (1974-1976) as we seek an analysis of 
executives whose legitimacy is attributed by a stable democratic constitutional framework, 
which exists since the Constitution of 1976. 
Our hypothesis assumes that the position of the secretary of state in Portugal is not only 
strictly political, being mainly held by individuals with no political experience. On the 
other hand, we believe that the recruitment and career on the government of secretaries of 
state with political experience is significantly different from that of secretaries of state with 
no political experience. We started from the idea that each individual is chosen by the 
government according to the skills by which they are essentially recognized in the political 
community. Of course, these skills come from their experiences prior to the appointment 
to the position, where the political experience is of central importance. The very name 
“independent”, quite common in Portugal, expresses the profile of someone who is not 
primarily recognized for their political skills but rather by their sectoral or management 
expertise. In this sense, we can consider that an individual with political experience may 
have personal characteristics and a different governmental career than an individual with-
out this experience. 
The next part of this article contains a brief background of the role of secretaries of 
state role in the governance structure in Portugal. In the second part, we analyze the 
political experience accumulated by secretaries of state at the time of their first appoint-
ment, as this analysis will identify the main routes of access to a governmental career, and 
it will also assess the political profile of these actors. In the third part, we analyze their 
main socio-demographic characteristics. The profile that emerges from this analysis will 
demonstrate the importance of certain social characteristics and educational and/or profes-
sional credentials. In the last part, we intend to obtain a characterization of the passage of 
secretaries of state through government. We will note the most important aspects, such as 
the length of governmental career, the governmental mobility, the portfolios and the min-
isterial ascent. These dimensions as well as the socio-demographic features will be ana-
lyzed in the light of the distinction between political and non-political.
 3.  For this purpose we constructed a SPSS database, essentially populated by documentary research based in 
primary sources such as curricula in public registers (Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Government 
website, Diário da República, Parliamentary Archives, parties files, institutional websites) but also on sec-
ondary sources of credibility and recognized quality (biographies of public figures such as Mário Soares, 
Freitas do Amaral and Cavaco Silva) and, alternatively, using the written press. We accessed the “Regime 
change and ministerial elite transformation in Southern Europe” Project Database, coordinated by Profes-
sors Pedro Tavares de Almeida, António Costa Pinto and Nancy Bermeo, and autonomous databases from 
researchers João Pedro Ruivo and Thierry Dias Coelho, so our gratitude goes to them all.
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SECRETARIES OF STATE IN PORTUGAL
After the Revolution of April 25, 1974, which restored democracy in Portugal, the 
role of secretaries of state is only understandable in the light of the structure of govern-
ment designed by the Constitution of 1976. According to article 185/2, secretaries of 
state have as their primary duty the direct collaboration with the ministers, as well as 
their replacement. They have no legislative or administrative original jurisdiction, and 
the definition of their responsibilities varies depending on what is stipulated in the order 
for appointment or decree-law (article 183/3 of the Constitution). They perform duties 
delegated by ministers in specific portfolios within the ministry, which means that they 
ensure in practice the connection in a given specific area between the ministry and the 
administrative institutions under their purview, as well as the effective implementation 
of policies delegated to them. The portfolio assigned to the secretary of state expresses, 
in general, which are these administrative institutions and these policies, specifying his 
responsibilities.
The relevance and autonomy of secretaries of state in Portugal, particularly in the 
policy-making process, has been underlined by the scarce literature devoted to the subject 
(Lobo, 2005b: 190, 193) and reinforced by former ministers and secretaries of state 
(Miranda & Sousa, 1985). However, and despite being an integral part of the government 
structure of most European countries, there is considerable cross-country variation of the 
duties performed by these political actors. Generally they share little constitutional sig-
nificance, the functional dependence on the minister, the departmental and not governmen-
tal level of responsibility (except the secretary of state for the presidency, if any). Müller 
and Strøm define junior ministers as “political appointees who do not have voting rights 
in the cabinet” (2000: 23) and Manow offers a more precise definition: “government posi-
tions and political appointees which do not formulate policy and prepare legislation on 
their own” (2008: 6-7). Blondel (1982: 211) refers to the position just as a second-tier 
under the Minister. However, as the last author acknowledges, a large plurality of designa-
tions and duties between different governments falls under this definition (ibid. 1982: 
214-215)4.
THE ROUTE TO POWER: POLITICAL AND NON-POLITICAL PATHWAYS
The previous political career is one of the factors with greater capacity to condition the 
selecting choice (Cabannes, 1990: 71). The acquired political skills, for example, in a 
parliamentary, partisan or previous executive experience (even if they did not take place 
immediately prior to the appointment) may well prove essential for the selection as secre-
tary of state. In this connection, it can be identified the preferred political channels of 
 4.  For a comparative and (essentially) formal analysis of secretaries of state duties, see Manow (2008: 7-12).
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access to the governmental career, as well as the degree of politicization of the actors who 
access the referred careers. 
The parliamentary route is usually considered one of the main paths towards positions 
in government (De Winter, 1991). Its relative importance is confirmed in the Portuguese 
case since the position of the national parliament members is one of the most relevant in 
the cursus honorum of the Portuguese secretaries of state, being surpassed only by party 
executive members (table 1). However, in absolute terms, only one in five of these indi-
viduals had had a parliamentary seat before ascending to government and the majority of 
those who held a position as members of parliament did so during a single mandate. On 
the other hand, the number of secretaries of state with parliamentary experience in the 
legislative assemblies of the Autonomous Regions or the European parliament is virtually 
non-existent. We verify very similar results in the Spanish case, with a rate of about 20% 
of secretaries of state with previous experience as parliamentarians in the period 1977-
2010 (Real-Dato & Rodriguez-Teruel, 2013: 22). A substantial difference when compared 
to the Portuguese case is the relevance of regional parliamentary experience, yet not 
exceeding 8% in Spain.
The low rate of parliamentarism of the Portuguese secretaries of state can be inter-
preted primarily as a result of the substantial autonomy enjoyed by the Prime Ministers 
when choosing the governmental cast (Portas & Valente, 1990; Silva, 2002, 2004; Lobo, 
2005a). In the specific case of the secretaries of state, the choice is often left to the discre-
tion of the minister, who, enjoying such autonomy, uses the sectoral or management exper-
tise as a main selection criterion (Portas & Valente, 1990: 334; Silva, 2002: 108). Sec-
ondly, there is a tendency in the Portuguese political system to relatively undervalue the 
role of parliamentary structures, such as commissions and parliamentary groups, despite 
the parliamentary rationalization trend (Leston-Bandeira, 2004). Finally, it must be borne 
in mind that there is an important tendency to choose “technocrats” and “independents” 
for the Portuguese governments (Tavares de Almeida & Pinto, 2006: 53; Tavares de 
Almeida & Pinto, 2012). 
Alongside the parliamentary experience, the party experience is considered one of the 
most important to access government positions since one of the main functions and defin-
ing characteristics of political parties is the selection of political elites (Czudnowski, 1975: 
225; Putnam, 1976: 49). This is, in fact, the political office held for more secretaries of 
state at the time of appointment. However, only about 26% of the individuals exerted party 
executive functions of national or regional nature. 
The reasons for the relatively low politicization of the secretaries of state should be 
addressed taking into account the structural weakness of the Portuguese parties, since there 
are traditionally low levels of territorial and social penetration (Jalali, 2007). The percep-
tion of this phenomenon has even led parties to promote pre-election initiatives for civil 
society, which have served as launch pads for the appointment of “independents” for gov-
ernment (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008; Tavares de Almeida & Pinto, 2012: 10). As an example, 
in the first of these initiatives, promoted by the Socialist Party in 1995 and called “Estados 
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Gerais” (General States), a wide range of different people with and without partisan 
involvement participated and were later be invited to enter government. In the specific case 
of the secretaries of state, two out of three individuals named in the thirteenth government 
participated in the General States. Moreover, 15 of the 32 appointed secretaries of state 
who were independent-that is, who had no party affiliation, had participated in this pre-
election initiative. 
Table 1. 
Political experience of portuguese secretaries of state (1976-2011)
Nr* %
With political experience 190 34.23
Parliament**    
Member of national parliament 109 19.64
Member of regional parliament 3 0.54
Member of european parliament 5 0.90
Party ***    
Party executive member 146 26.31
National party executive member 125 22.52
Regional party executive member 84 15.14
Regional or local    
Prefect (Civil governor) 8 1.44
Member of Regional Government 3 0.54
Mayor 10 1.80
Councillor 32 5.77
Member of City Council 35 6.31
Executive
Under-secretary of State 22 3.96
WITHOUT POLITICAL EXPERIENCE 365 65.77
Total 555 100.00
Source: Own elaboration with data from the various sources listed in footnote 5. 
* Concerns to positions held before the first appointment as secretary of state. Multiple counting was used in order to account 
for individuals with various positions.
** Individuals who were elected to Parliament but never held office for having been immediately selected to government are 
excluded from the count. 
*** We consider national party executive members individuals who have integrated national bodies of the parties; we consider 
regional party executive members individuals who have integrated district bodies of the parties, according to their statutes in 
force at the time of their appointment. Local political positions were disregarded because there are no consolidated official 
sources.
This low politicization is particularly true for secretaries of state due to the very spe-
cific sectoral nature of this position, especially as opposed to the more general nature of 
the ministerial office. Indeed, as one moves down the governmental structure, the 
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specificity of governance areas increases and it would be natural to increase the tendency 
to choose more specialized individuals, accordingly.
On access to office, the executive experience, as under-secretary of state, does not stand 
out as being a particularly important political experience, but we should take into account 
that this position is not formally part of the government structure, existing only in a few 
executives and in some specific ministries along the Portuguese democracy. 
The regional or local politics is in many countries a real springboard for governmental 
careers (Thiébault, 1991). However, in Portugal previous political experience at regional 
and local levels did not represent more than 6% of previous experiences of secretaries of 
state. The low representation of regional political experience as access port to this position 
is necessarily linked to the fact that Portugal takes the form of a unitary —but administra-
tively decentralized— state. Indeed, in Spain, both ministers (Rodriguez-Teruel, 2011: 
315-322) and secretaries of state (Real-Dato & Rodríguez-Teruel, 2013: 22) have more 
experience in regional political arenas. Moreover, the lack of territorial dimension and the 
absence of notable cultural cleavages were two important factors to prevent the strengthen-
ing of identities and regional political practices in Portugal. 
Another reason associated with the low representation of regional political experience 
in Portugal is the fact that the regional offices have always maintained a great autonomy 
from the national political process: while the prefects have become increasingly controlled 
positions by the regional party structures, the composition of regional governments 
remained within the autonomy of the regional parties. With regard to local political experi-
ence, the low number of big cities in Portugal has rarely allowed for the construction of 
solid municipal careers, with sufficient national projection to promote access to govern-
ment offices. On the other hand, only recently the Portuguese local governments have 
known more autonomy and financial capacity, considered important conditions for the 
passage from a local political career to a governmental political career (Tavares de Almei-
da & Pinto, 2006: 52-3; Thiébault, 1991: 31).
The parliamentary, party, executive and regional or local routes are several types of 
political background where individuals can acquire relevant skills in order to be appointed 
secretary of state. These experiences often overlap, not being so rare the cases of individu-
als who accumulate, in particular, parliamentary and party experiences. This is what Blon-
del (1985) refers to as “party-cum-parliamentary route”. In the Portuguese case, about 
15% of secretaries of state accumulated, at the time of their first appointment, these two 
types of political experiences. 
At the other end of the spectrum lie individuals who were appointed without any of 
these political experiences, representing 65.77% of the total. This political inexperience is 
often counterbalanced with high specialization. In Blondel’s own words, “Western govern-
ments may place great emphasis on representation; but the question of technical compe-
tence cannot altogether be avoided” (1985: 191). This author was one of the first to draw 
attention to the importance of a systematic and comparative study of the specialization of 
ministers (ibid.). Blodel’s studies aimed at overcoming the traditional dichotomy between 
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political ministers and ministers originating from Public Administration or the military 
sector by creating a new typology that would better reflect the link between prior profes-
sional experience and the ministerial portfolio. To this end, he used a differentiating crite-
rion based on the adequacy of the previously exercised profession and the ministerial 
portfolio to which the individual was appointed, resulting in two distinct types of minis-
ters: “amateurs”, when there is no link between the previous occupation and the portfolio; 
and “specialists” when the portfolio is closely related to its previous occupation (ibid.: 
22-23). 
The essential difference is between those who had a specific preparation to perform the 
ministerial function at stake and those who had no such preparation (ibid.: 23). Although 
Blondel does not make a longitudinal analysis of the technical expertise of ministers, his 
typology and the realization that “[i]n every region of the world specialists are a substantial 
proportion of all ministers” (ibid.: 195) had great influence on later studies, such as those 
by Müller-Rommel (1988), Bakema and Secker (1988), De Winter (1991), Beckman 
(2006) and Rodríguez-Teruel (2011).
Most of these studies use, on the footsteps of Blondel, differentiating criteria related to 
the adequacy of experiences (academic, professional and even political) prior to appoint-
ment and the portfolio held by the minister. The main exception is De Winter, who uses as 
the sole criterion the political experience (parliamentary and party), creating a binary 
typology that includes “insiders” and “outsiders”. The first have a minimum of 10 year 
parliamentary experience together with party experience at national level, while the latter 
do not have any prior political experience (De Winter, 1991: 44-7). With this distinction, 
the author manages to differentiate ministers who were chosen for their political skills and 
those who were chosen because of their sectoral and/or management expertise:
“[n]on-parliamentary ministers may be regarded as not being true politicians, 
especially if they do not belong to the leadership circles of their party. They appear 
to be men and women who have reached the government because they are special-
ists in the subject matter of the department or have experience as managers of large 
or complex organizations. […] such men and women can be regarded as outsiders” 
(ibid.: 46).
We believe that the De Winter’s typology is preferable to the previous because it seems 
to be more convincing from the ministerial recruitment point of view and fits particularly 
to the position of secretary of state. Indeed, this distinction holds, in essence, the reason 
for choosing a particular minister or secretary of state. This criteria allows, therefore, to 
include as “outsiders” not only individuals selected for having expertise in their portfolio, 
but also those who have a manager profile, due to their academic and/or professional back-
ground, although such training or route are not related to the portfolio they take. Tavares 
de Almeida and Pinto (2012) apply a very similar criterion for Portugal and give the exam-
ple of the Health Minister of the Nineteenth Constitutional Government, Paulo Macedo, 
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formerly senior official of the Ministry of Finance and manager of a private bank: despite 
there was no match between his education or career and the ministerial portfolio, Macedo 
was unanimously considered a non-political. On the other hand, the secretaries of state’s 
portfolios have a much more specific content than the ministerial ones and, therefore, to 
require an appropriate professional or educational experience would excessively restrict 
the category of non-political secretaries of state.
We have adapted, however, the criteria used by De Winter by better adjusting to the ear-
lier and more specific political career of the secretaries of state. Thus, we consider to be 
defining of political experience an extended set of political relevant offices, including: mem-
ber of the national, regional or European parliament; national or regional party executive 
member, prefect, member of a regional government; mayor; councillor; member of a city 
council; and under-secretary of state. On the other hand, we consider it to be sufficient the 
exercise of any of these positions prior to the first appointment as secretary of state.
Therefore, throughout this article we shall call ‘political’ the secretaries of state who 
held some of the offices mentioned above. We will designate as ‘non-political’ the secre-
taries of state who have not exercised any of these positions, regardless of other functions 
of politicized nature, such as advisors or leaders of interest groups.
From the application of this distinction to the secretaries of state of the Portuguese 
democracy we verified the following results: 190 individuals fall under the category of 
‘political’, corresponding to 34.2% of the total; and 365 ‘non-political individuals’, cor-
responding to 65.8 %. This distinction corresponds to two parallel routes of entering gov-
ernment. Now we must understand the implications of this distinction in their socio-
demographic profiles and governmental careers.
WHO RISES TO POWER: THE SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE
The recruitment of secretaries of state is a very selective choice of individuals who will 
join government, that is, one of the most restricted elite circles in power (Dogan, 1989). In 
this choice, certain personal characteristics and certain educational and/or professional 
credentials may prove decisive. When the secretary of state is chosen, these characteristics 
and credentials are taken into account, so it is possible to identify the collective socio-
demographic profile of these individuals during the Portuguese democracy.
When considering gender, the office of secretary of state in Portugal is, almost exclu-
sively, a male function, for 91% of subjects who exercised it were men. The low feminiza-
tion rate of this position should be understood as a broader phenomenon, not unique to 
Portugal and not restricted to political elites (Viegas & Faria, 2001). Indeed, the proportion 
of female secretaries of state in the Spanish democracy (1977-2010) stands at 13.5% 
(Real-Dato & Rodríguez-Teruel, 2013: 12). The main factors involved are historical, cul-
tural, sociological and economic as well as strictly political and they are often intercon-
nected (Davis, 1997; Siaroff, 2000; Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2005). 
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If we take into account the different political profiles, the gender difference between 
political and non-political secretaries of state is not statistically significant (χ²(1) = 
0,438, p = 0,508). Consequently, the claim that “specialist recruitment patterns aid in 
women in cabinet” (Siaroff, 2000: 209), is not confirmed for the Portuguese secretaries 
of state.
Although the 50 female secretaries of state represent only 9% of the analyzed universe, 
the proportion of women in this position has increased in Portugal over time. In fact, in the 
period between 1976 and 1995, the percentage of female secretaries of state was around 
6%, but between 1995 and 2011 it reached to about 13%. The following chart shows the 
evolution from government to government, while also allowing for a comparison with 
women who have been ministers.
Figure 1.


































































































Source: Own elaboration with data from the various sources listed in footnote 5.
The arrival of women to ministerial positions was much later than their arrival to the 
position of secretary of state as the first female minister was named in 1985. Since then, 
the proportion of female secretaries of state and ministers was not very different, with the 
exception of Socrates II government (2009-2011), when about one-third of ministers were 
women as opposed to 13% of female secretaries of state.
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As for age, the average age of access the office of secretary of state in Portugal is 
around 43 years old. Although the youngest person to be appointed was aged 25 years and 
the older was aged 67 years, appointments at these ages are exceptional, since about 80% 
of appointees are aged between 30 and 50 years. The distinction between the age profile 
of political and non-political secretaries of state is not very significant for, in average age 
of appointment of the former is 41 years and the latter is 43 years. The difference is accen-
tuated slightly for the pre-30 years’ appointees, where the relative weight of political 
secretaries of state is higher. Indeed, individuals with non-political profiles generally have 
a longer educational and professional career, which makes it more difficult for them to 
enter government before the age of 30. On the contrary, this situation becomes more usual 
in the case of individuals with a political profile: the early belonging to the party executive 
structures and/or the exercise of one or two terms as a Member of Parliament may consti-
tute sufficient credentials to trigger a governmental appointment before or shortly after the 
age of 30.
Given that the position of secretary of state is for many of these individuals their first 
relevant political office, the age of 43 years can be considered relatively high, especially if 
one takes into account that the average age of the Portuguese ministers between 1974 and 
1999 is around 46 years (Tavares de Almeida & Pinto, 2006: 34). It would be naturally 
expected that secretaries of state were in average younger than the ministers. However, we 
expected that, being secretaries of state often seen as “minister’s apprentices”, the differ-
ence could be more pronounced. 
In educational terms, we can characterize the secretaries of state as highly qualified 
political elites since 96% of them had at the time of appointment a college degree. On the 
other hand, there is a considerable amount of individuals with a higher educational degree, 
including a PhD. In Spain, the secretaries of state also have a high level of education, to 
the extent that only about 2% of the individuals did not have university degrees and about 
35% held diplomas of postgraduate studies or a PhD (Real-Dato & Rodríguez-Teruel, 
2013: 14). 
Education stands as a key differentiating attribute to these individuals (χ²(3) = 30,293, 
p < 0,001): non-political secretaries of state have more post-graduations and PhD than 
political secretaries of state. On the other hand, among the latter the proportion without 
university education is higher.
Law and Economics are their main academic areas, since about 59% held their highest 
level of education in these areas5. In addition to Law and Economics, Engineering and 
Social Sciences are noteworthy. In fact, these four areas represent about 84% of the aca-
demic degrees, which is remarkable especially when considering the growing diversity of 
university courses being offered in Portugal in recent decades.
 5.  Note that even if we take into account the whole academic career, the prevalence of individuals who received 
some degree (Bachelor, Post-graduate/Masters or PhD) in Law and Economics throughout their academic 
record remains. Thus, 32.5% studied Law at some point and 30% Economics. 
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Figure 2.
Academic qualifications of Portuguese Secretaries of State according to their politi-


























Source: Own elaboration with data from the various sources listed in footnote 5.
Our data show that secretaries of state with and without a political background come 
from different training areas (χ²(4) = 23,578, p < 0,001). The trend for the prevalence of 
Law and Economics and, in a second place Engineering and Social Sciences remains when 
we distinguish between political and non-political. However, there are differences in the 
weight of these areas in each of these profiles. Indeed, although Law is the most wide-
spread degree among secretaries of state, there are significant differences between non-
political and political secretaries of state. Among the first Economics is the main training 
area and therefore among the last Law assumes a substantial weight. On the other hand, in 
the case of Engineering the difference is small but higher among non-political secretaries 
of state, whereas Social Sciences have a relatively higher weight among the political sec-
retaries of state. 
As Weber (2005: 81) reminded us, the profession of lawyer is associated to a number 
of important features for the exercise of political functions. The office of secretary of 
state, despite not sharing the requirement in argument and oratory that the office of 
minister or even members of Parliament have, carries out a diverse set of political func-
tions where legal training can be an important competence (Theakston, 1987). There-
fore, it is natural that it is between the political secretaries of state that Law is more 
relevant. On the other hand, the gradual increase of economic formation has a special 
impact on non-political secretaries of state, insofar as these other skills are essentially 
valued, whereby the educational management and planning skills are a fundamental 
asset. 
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Figure 3.
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Source: Own elaboration with data from the various sources listed in footnote 5.
Lisbon is the most important city in the academic degree of secretaries of state. The 
Lisbon University (Universidade de Lisboa) and the Technical University of Lisbon (Uni-
versidade Técnica de Lisboa) were the more populated universities, and the University of 
Lisbon Law School (Faculdade de Direito de Lisboa) and the Economy and Management 
Superior Institute (Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão) constituted real nurseries of 
governmental recruitment6. After the capital, the most prominent cities in the national 
educational path for secretaries of state are Coimbra and Oporto. The number of individu-
als who attended foreign universities during their academic career deserves, however, 
special mention. In fact, about 20% of them obtained a degree in a foreign university, with 
particular emphasis on British and American ones.
As for the professional field, the main occupations that secretaries of state were 
engaged in were, respectively, university teacher, administrative civil servant, business 
manager and lawyer, which together represent about 76% of occupations. There is, how-
ever, a clear difference between the professional profile of political and non-political sec-
retaries of state (χ²(4) = 20,077, p < 0,001): among the latter predominate professions 
involving the acquisition of specific skills, being educational in nature (such as university 
teachers, sectorial, administrative civil servants) or management (as business managers); 
 6.  One in three secretaries of state graduated in one of these colleges (about 18% from the University of Lis-
bon Law School and about 14% in the Economy and Management Superior Institute). The Technical Higher 
Institute (Instituto Superior Técnico) and the University of Coimbra Law School (Faculdade de Direito da 
Universidade de Coimbra) follow each with about 8%.
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in contrast, among the first are included more general professions such as lawyer or even 
full-time politician7.
Figure 4.
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Source: Own elaboration with data from the various sources listed in footnote 5.
The weight of university teachers, highly skilled in a specific knowledge area, confirms 
the university as a means of preferential recruitment of Portuguese governmental elites 
(Tavares de Almeida & Pinto, 2006: 41-2), and in particular a privileged means to recruit 
non-political individuals.
The passage through public administration is also significant to the extent that these 
functions are often a fundamental experience to be recognized as someone with valuable 
sectoral expertise. This recognition may be even greater when individuals have a long 
career in the public service, having covered the entire chain of command until they reached 
the top of the career in a given specific area. Data shows that this occupational route was 
indeed important especially for non-political secretaries of state. Another important career, 
more prominent among non-political secretaries of state, is associated with business man-
agement. Finally, law is particularly relevant among political secretaries of state who have 
exercised it often as their secondary activity. 
 7.  We consider as “full-time politician” individuals who, prior to their first appointment as secretaries of state, 
had a primarily political career (in Parliament, in local government, in policy advisory positions, etc.), and 
without having never regularly exercised a profession outside politics.
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As we can see, most professions are connected to the State. Indeed, about 80% of secre-
taries of state had had some kind of occupation of a public nature before being appointed to 
office, leaving only 20% of them linked exclusively to the private sector. These results dem-
onstrate a great weight of professional activities related to the state in access to office, as 
opposed to strictly private career paths. Bearing in mind the distinction between individuals 
with political and non-political profile, we found that the latter are more linked to the private 
sector than the first. Also, the results demonstrate that very rarely non-political secretaries of 
state acquire specific skills outside the state orbit; the usual being educational skills as uni-
versity teachers or sectoral skills as administrative civil servants. Similarly, the acquisition of 
management skills occurs essentially through positions in public institutions and companies. 
THE TIME IN POWER: THE GOVERNMENTAL CAREER
A position in government is usually considered the zenith of an individual’s political career. 
But, only if we analyze separately the route to government and the route in government, we can 
be able to interpret what this position means to the governmental institution and the individuals 
occupying it (Rodríguez-Teruel, 2011: 17-18). The time, position and mobility line are, in this 
sense, of particular interest in the analysis of the governmental career of secretaries of state. 
In temporal terms, the average duration of a governmental career as secretary of state 
is about two and a half years. Although there are cases of longer governmental careers, 
such as Jorge Figueiredo Lopes, secretary of state for about 13 years, as a rule the secretar-
ies of state have short careers. Short-term governmental careers remove effective capacity 
to governmental offices, to the extent that in a few months individuals do not even have 
the time to adapt to governmental functions and dynamics. Given that, as we have seen, 
most of the secretaries of state did not have any previous political experience, this learning 
period would be essential for an effective job performance. However, 29% of secretaries 
of state remained in office for less than one year. On the other hand, only a very small 
group, consisting of 9 individuals, exceeded eight years and they can, therefore, be consid-
ered exceptional cases such as Jorge Figueiredo Lopes. 
When we distinguish between political and non-political secretaries of state, there is a 
slightly higher average duration of governmental career of the first (2.7 compared to 2.1 
years). The tendency for political secretaries of state to hold longer careers is statistically 
significant (U = 28,205, p < 0,001) and it is usually associated with the existence of 
higher expectations of return to government by these individuals and the fact that the dis-
missal of non-political one, as a rule, involves less partisan costs. Indeed, unlike the 
political, those are perceived as having specific tasks (“men with a mission”)8, so it is 
natural completing only one term and being more prone to reshuffles.
 8. João Correia, Secretary of State for Justice in the XVIII Constitutional Government, justified in the following 
manner his earlier departure from government: “I entered government to fulfill a mission. I believe that 
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Figure 5. 
Governmental career duration of Portuguese Secretaries of State according to their 
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Source: Own elaboration with data from the various sources listed in footnote 5.
The relative short career of governmental elites in Portugal cannot be dissociated from 
structural factors, such as the transition to democracy and rejuvenation dynamics. Indeed, 
according to Blondel (1985: 112) the transitions between political regimes may have the 
effect of shortening the duration of ministerial mandates until the new regime stabilizes. 
In Portugal, the stabilization process starts from 1982, with the important I Constitutional 
Amendment (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 116-129). In 1987, a single party government was 
elected with absolute majority for the first time. Until then, Portugal had only known 
minority governments, governments composed of various party combinations or presiden-
tial initiative governments, formulas that had failed to provide the required governmental 
stability: between 1976 and 1987 no government completed the 4-year term. 
Another important factor associated with short governmental careers is the rejuvena-
tion dynamics in systems where the parliamentary support of the executive is essential 
(Blondel, 1985: 143). This rejuvenation dynamics tends to become more pronounced when 
the Prime Minister enjoys greater autonomy in the selection and dismissal of members of 
the government, which actually happens in Portugal (Lobo, 2005a; Pinto and Tavares de 
Almeida, 2009). In fact, by choosing a regular substitution strategy of some ministers, the 
Prime Minister triggers almost always the replacement of secretaries of state under the 
tutelage of these ministers.
mission is fulfilled and everything else I could do would just spoil it”. Interview to the “Jornal i” newspaper 
(27 November 2010).
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Given that the average governmental career is two and a half years and almost a third 
of secretaries of state occupied the position for a shorter period than one year, we can 
conclude that the office of secretary of state is far from being a career or even a consoli-
dated stage of political career. Among individuals with political profiles this transience is 
due in part to the fact that the office of secretary of state is regarded as “passage”, often to 
ministerial functions but also to return to local or parliamentary politics with greater 
political capital. Among the non-political this position is usually seen as an occasional 
opportunity to realize concrete measures in an area where they feel comfortable.
Most secretaries of state were appointed for just one term (although it eventually held 
different portfolios within that period) of the same party. Consequently, mobility between 
governments cannot be considered high: the office of secretary of state in Portugal is gen-
erally exercised continuously after a single appointment. Still, one in four individuals was 
appointed in two governments and about 10% held positions in 3 or more governments 
throughout their governmental careers.
Figure 6.
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Source: Own elaboration with data from the various sources listed in footnote 5.
There is a statistically significant difference between secretaries of state with political 
profile and non-political profile (U = 31,161, p = 0,022). Indeed, political ones have 
greater mobility between governments because, as a rule, they remain politically active 
after the first appointment, keeping aspirations to return to government. Paraphrasing 
Dogan when referring to the ministers: “It is beautiful to be a minister. It is still better to 
remain one or to become one again” (1989: 241). On the contrary, the expected return to 
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the government by non-political secretaries of state is lower since they generally face 
political office as an interruption of their career, then return to the profession where they 
are experts. 
The majority of secretaries of state only held a single portfolio along their governmen-
tal career. Indeed, about 81% of individuals always held office in the same portfolio 
(although possibly in more than a government), while 16.4% were appointed in their 
career in two substantially different portfolios. Even more rarely are those who were 
appointed for three or more different portfolios. These results suggest a very low mobility 
between portfolios: in general, when secretaries of state are appointed for the first time to 
a portfolio, they remain in the same portfolio throughout their governmental career. The 
low mobility between portfolios is even more pronounced among non-political secretaries 
of state (U = 31,635, p = 0,013) and must be construed in the light of the major skills 
needed for each profile: the specific expertise of these individuals make mobility more 
difficult between portfolios, since they are specialists in a particular governmental action 
area. Rather, political secretaries of state have more general skills (Bakema, 1991: 95-6).
The distribution of secretaries of state through the various ministerial portfolios shows 
that there is a clear differentiation in the allocation of portfolios based on political versus 
non-political profiles (χ²(1) = 25,944, p < 0,001). There is a tendency for non-political 
individuals to be called for economic and social portfolios associated with more complex 
areas and of technical nature. In contrast, political secretaries of state are mostly present 
in sovereignty and policy coordination portfolios, where the political content is more pro-
nounced. These portfolios, which made up the core of the post-2nd World War govern-
ments and represent the classical functions of the state, actually have a more traditionally 
political substrate than the remaining portfolios, brought by the development of state func-
tions (Blondel, 1982: 181-189). In this sense, it is understandable the preference for indi-
viduals with more political profiles to fill these positions. On the contrary, in more sector-
specific ministerial portfolios the specific expertise or management skills becomes a more 
decisive criterion than the political skills. In the particular case of the secretaries of state, 
where the specificity of the areas of governance increases, the choice of non-political 
individuals gains special meaning. So about 79% of secretaries of state with non-political 
profile did not held political portfolios. Rather, the more general character of the political 
allows them to not be limited to political portfolios.
The office of secretary of state is important in the access to ministerial career, since 
about 46% of ministers appointed between 1976 and 1999 had been secretaries of state 
(Tavares de Almeida & Pinto, 2006: 48). If we take into account the individuals who exer-
cised the office of secretary of state, the ministerial ascent is more frequent among politi-
cal. However, not always the appointment is made exclusively on ministerial portfolios on 
which they have been secretaries of state. In fact, most individuals that ascended to minis-
ters were appointed in ministerial portfolios where they had never exercised that govern-
mental office. There is, however, a difference between profiles: while the political tend to 
hold different portfolios when they ascend to minister, most non-political are appointed 
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only in ministerial portfolios where they held the position of secretary of state. This dif-
ference should be understood in light of the increased specialization of the skills of these 
individuals, usually associated exclusively to the ministry area in which they are consid-
ered experts. On the contrary, being presumably selected based on their political skills, 
political can make use of these skills in government in a more diverse set of portfolios. 
Figure 7.






















Source: Own elaboration with data from the various sources listed in footnote 5.
CONCLUSION
The literature has limited itself to looking at secretaries of state as partisan pawns in 
coalition governments or as minister’s apprentices. However, this position in Portugal can 
hardly be considered in these terms. On the contrary, rather than a means to reward party 
elites, a means of partisan balance at the time of distribution of offices in coalition govern-
ments, or a means of control of government ministers belonging to the other party (“watch-
dogs”), secretaries of state emerge as a depoliticized function, set in a short and occasional 
governmental career. In fact, secretaries of state are appointed both in coalition governments 
and one-party governments and mostly do not hold a politicized profile. On the contrary, in 
general these are individuals with no political experience but with high academic credentials 
and a professional career where they are considered experts. The exercise of the office as 
secretary of state appears to most as a momentary interruption from their career, a time when 
they have the opportunity to apply their expertise with greater social impact. 
On the other hand, only in a mitigated way can we consider the position as essentially 
having a learning basis bearing in mind the preparation of individuals for the position of 
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minister. In fact, although half of ministers have previously been secretaries of state 
(Tavares de Almeida & Pinto, 2006: 48), most of them were appointed in a ministry where 
they had never been secretaries of state. Furthermore, the governmental career is very 
short, which may have contributed to derail an effective political learning and adaptation 
to the governing problems. 
Thus, the position of secretary of state stands out in Portugal with an effective functional 
content where the adequacy of the individual profile to sectoral and political functions per-
formed on the job is relevant. Thus, despite the subsequent need to confirm the causality of 
inferences presented here, we find that important differences emerge between individuals 
with political experience and individuals with other experience and skills outside politics, 
such as sectoral and/or management, i.e. between political and non-political secretaries of 
state. In effect, if the profile of secretary of state is non-political, it is more likely for them to 
hold a post-graduate degree or even a PhD, possibly in Economics. In professional terms, it 
increases the chances of them being university teachers and having a career of public nature. 
The probability of his career being restricted to a single portfolio (non-political) in a single 
government increases considerably and in case they become ministers, something very 
unlikely, they are presumed to be appointed in the same ministerial portfolio where the posi-
tion of secretary of state was held. On the contrary, if the individual has a political profile, it 
is likely that their educational background is Law and they probably practice law as their 
main occupation. In terms of governmental career, their generalist profile allows them not to 
be restricted to political portfolios. On the other hand, it increases the chances for them to be 
selected in more than one cabinet and more than one portfolio.
The differences between political and non-political secretaries of state show the impor-
tance of the political profile in the study of governmental elites. Without this distinction 
many essential aspects for the understanding of the socio-demographic profile and govern-
mental career of Portuguese secretaries of state would have remained hidden. Thus, secretar-
ies of state have, in general, a non-political profile but a core minority of individuals with 
political experience, whose socio-demographic characteristics and governmental career are 
significantly different, remains identifiable. In this sense, we must recognize the coexistence 
of these two groups with different political profiles within the governmental elite. The evolu-
tion of these profiles over time as well as the impacts of this coexistence in ministerial and 
governmental performance throughout the Portuguese democracy remains to be assessed. 
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ANNEX
Table 2. 
Ministers and secretaries of state of the Portuguese democratic governments (1976-2011)




I Soares I PS 20 56
II Soares II PS+CDS 16 38
III Nobre da Costa - 14 31
IV Mota Pinto - 15 36
V Pintasilgo - 16 33
VI Sá Carneiro PSD+CDS+PPM 14 40
VII Balsemão I PSD+CDS+PPM 18 43
VIII Balsemão II PSD+CDS+PPM 18 56
IX Soares III PS+PSD 21 54
X Cavaco Silva I PSD 13 38
XI Cavaco Silva II PSD 25 69
XII Cavaco Silva III PSD 25 73
XIII Guterres I PS 24 62
XIV Guterres II PS 28 69
XV Barroso PSD+CDS 21 48
XVI Santana Lopes PSD+CDS 19 41
XVII Sócrates I PS 21 48
XVIII Sócrates II PS 16 38
Source: Own elaboration.
* Total number of individuals appointed during the mandate.
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